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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for damages for personal injuries
sustained by the plaintiff Gilbert Capson in an industrial
accident, allegedly as the result of the negligence of defendants .
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUftT
The district court granted defendant Arctic Circle,
Inc.'s motion to dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint
and dismissed the action as to said defendant.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment
below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, commenced this action
against defendants for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff Gilbert Capson in an industrial accident which allegedly
resulted from negligence upon the part of the defendants.
Defendant Arctic Circle, acting as its own contractor, was
building a place of business.

Plaintiff Gilbert Capson was

employed by said defendant to do work on the foundation of
the building.

(R. 1, 33)
- 1 -

In plaintiffs' original complaint, they alleged in
their first cause of action as follows:
"2. On or about July 26th, 1972, plaintiff Gilbert Capson was a subcontractor doing
foundation work on the premises of the defendant Arctic Circle, Inc., , . .
"3. Arctic Circle, Inc., or its contractors or agents performed excavation work on
the premises, which excavation was five feet
or more in depth below grade.
If

4. Plaintiff in performance of his
subcontract obligation formed the foundation
in the excavation provided by the defendant
Arctic Circle, Inc., and concrete was ordered
by Arctic Circle, Inc., to be poured in the
forms provided by the plaintiff Gilbert
Capson.
"5. The defendant, Arctic Circle, Inc.,
by and through its agents directed the placement of the A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete
Company truck for discharging the concrete."
(Emphasis added) (R. 1)
These allegations were adopted by reference in plaintiffs'
second and third causes of action.

(R. 3)

Plaintiffs subsequently obtained leave to file an
amended complaint, increasing the prayer for damages.

(R, 25)

Defendant attacked plaintiffs' original complaint, as amended,
by motion to dismiss.

(R. 15-16)

That motion was heard

before Judge Croft, who granted the motion, with leave to
plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint.

- 2 -

(R. 31-32)

Plaintiffs subsequently filed their second amended complaint,
essentially restating the allegations of their original complaint and adding a fourth count for benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act.

(R. 33-40)

In their second

amended complaint, plaintiffs also added the following allegation in Count I:
"7. That the defendant Arctic Circle,
Inc., directed the work of the plaintiff as
to how he should hold the concrete forms during said pouring.11 (Emphasis added) (R. 34)
This allegation was likewise adopted in plaintiffs' second
and third counts.

(R. 35)

Defendant Arctic Circle attacked the second amended
complaint by a motion to dismiss, since the defects attacked
by the original motion were not cured by the amendment, and
in fact were exaggerated.

(R. 41-42)

The motion to dismiss

the second amended complaint was heard by Judge Sawaya, and
after hearing, and after being taken under advisement, the
motion was granted.

(R. 51-52)

This appeal followed.

(R.52)

ARGUMENT
POINT I. PLAINTIFF GILBERT CAPSON WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF DEFENDANT ARCTIC CIRCLE, INC., WITHIN THE MEANtNG OF THE UTAH
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, AND THEREFORE HIS SOLE REMEDY IS
FOR BENEFITS UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
In their brief, plaintiffs concede that the court's
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ruling was correct insofar as it pertains to the third and
fourth counts.

(Plaintiffs* Brief, p. 8)

This court,

therefore, need consider only the correctness of the court's
ruling as to Counts I and II.

Plaintiffs also concede in

their brief that plaintiff Gilbert Capson was acting under
the direction and control of defendant Arctic Circle at the
time of the accident.

(Appellants1 Brief, p. 2)

The argument advanced by plaintiffs in support of
their appeal wholly disregards the basis upon which the trial
court acted in granting this defendant's motion.

Section 35-

1-42, U.C.A., 1953, insofar as material here, provides as
follows :
"Where any employer procures any work
to be done wholly or in part for him by a
contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part
or process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor, and all persons
employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within
the meaning of this section, employees of
such original employer. . . ." (Emphasis
added)
i
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Section 35-1-60, U.C.A., 1953, provides insofar as
material here as follows:
"The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
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injuries sustained by an employee, whether
resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall
be the exclusive remedy against any officer,
agent or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this
act shall be in place of any and all other
civil liability whatsoever, at common law or
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse,
widow, children, parents, dependents, next
of kin, heirs, personal representatives,
guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on
account of any accident or injury or death,
in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated
or incurred by such employee in the course
of or because of or arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or against any
officer, agent or employee of the employer
based upon any accident, injury or death of
an employee. . . ." (Emphasis added)
These statutory provisions have been interpreted
by this court in a series of decisions commencing with Smith
v. Alfred Brown Co., 27 Ut.2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972), and
Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Ut.2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972).

These

decisions were followed in Doyle v. Facilities, Inc., 29
Ut.2d 41, 504 P.2d 1006, and Adamson v. Poland Construction
Co., 29 Ut.2d 286, 508 P.2d 805.

In the case last cited

this court said:
"In the recent case of Smith v. Brown
we had occasion to consider a closely analogous situation. We there set forth the
principles which should be considered in
applying the Workmen's Compensation Act to

- 5 -

such a problem: that the purpose of the act
is to provide speedy and certain compensation for workmen and their dependents and to
avoid the delay, expense and uncertainty
which were involved prior to the act; and
the concomitant purpose of protecting the
employer from the hazards of exorbitant and
in some instances perhaps ruinous liabilities. Those principles are applicable here
and correlated to them is the proposition
that the act should be liberally construed
and applied to provide coverage and effectuate those purposes.
"Fundamental standards of justice dictate that it would be inconsistent to apply
the act liberally in favor of the injured
workman in order to find coverage by one
employer on a project, and then to reverse
that policy and adopt a restrictive view to
exclude coverage of another employer on the
project so that a suit could be maintained
against him. . . .
11

'Where any employer procures any work
to be done wholly or in part for him by a
contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part
or process in the trade or business of the
employer, such contractor, and all persons
employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any
such subcontractors, shall be deemed, . . .
employees of such original employer.IM
It was upon the basis of this line of decisions
that both Judge Croft and Judge Sawaya determined that plaintiffs! several complaints failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.

- 6-

The case of Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., Inc.,
Ut.2d

, 546 P. 2d 896, following the same reasoning

and arriving at the same holding, was decided on February 20,
1976, five days before the hearing on this defendant's motion
to dismiss the second amended complaint.

That decision had

not come to the attention of counsel at tihe time of hearing,
and therefore was not brought to the attention of the court,
but it adds further support to the correctness of the trial
court1s ruling.
The allegations of plaintiffs1 several complaints,
and particularly paragraph 7 of the first count of the
second amended complaint, clearly bring tjhis case within
the line of authorities above cited.

Plaintiffs by their

own allegations specifically establish that defendant Arctic
Circle not only retained supervision or control over Gilbert
Capson1s work, but actually controlled the details as to how
the work should be performed.

The trial court correctly

held that under the provisions of Section 35-1-42, as it
existed at the time of the accident, and as interpreted by
this court, Gilbert Capson was an employee of defendant
Arctic Circle, his sole remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that his several complaints failed to
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted as against
defendant Arctic Circle.
POINT II. PLAINTIFF LINDA CAPSON HAS NO ACTION FOR THE
PERSONAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY HER HUSBAND.
In their complaint, plaintiffs claim not only
damages for the injuries sustained by Gilbert Capson, but
his wife also claims damages for losses allegedly sustained
by her.

That such claims and actions are not recognized

in this state under the married women's emancipation statutes was firmly established by the holding of this court in
Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Ut.2d 143, 493 P.2d 985, where it was
said:
"The wife has no basis for her action.
At common law she could not sue for loss of
consortium, and under the Married Women1s
Act no cause of action was given to her for
negligent injury to her husband. . . ."
(Emphasis added)
This is an additional ground for dismissing the action as
against plaintiff Linda Capson.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint did not state
a claim upon which relief could be granted as against defendant Arctic Circle.

The trial court correctly granted

- 8 -

defendant Arctic Circle's motion to dismiss, and the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN & EVANS

V-

Ray R. Christensen
Attorneys for defendant
and respondent Arctic Circle, Inc
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